A show cause notice that invokes Section 74 of the CGST Act makes a serious claim: not merely that tax was short paid or credit wrongly availed, but that fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts caused it. That claim is what unlocks the five-year limitation period in place of the normal three. On 25 August 2026, in Tata Steel Ltd. v. Union of India, the Supreme Court set out what such a notice must contain, and struck one down for failing to contain it.
Read against the judgment, every Section 74 notice must now pass three tests, each answerable from the notice and its own history. This guide sets them out in the order a defence should take them.
Test one: was the notice within time under Section 73 at all?
Start with the arithmetic, because it decides how much work Section 74 has to do. Section 73(10) requires the order to be issued within three years from the date of furnishing the annual return for the year in question, and Section 73(2) requires the notice at least three months before that deadline. The clock runs from the annual return date, and for the early GST years those dates were repeatedly extended by notifications under Section 44(1). The Supreme Court's pandemic orders then excluded the period from 15 March 2020 to 28 February 2022 from limitation.
For the three years covered by the Tata Steel notice, the computation the Court settled is this:
| Financial year | Annual return due date | Three years therefrom | Position after the pandemic exclusion |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2018-19 | 31 December 2020 | 31 December 2023 | 28 February 2025 |
| 2019-20 | 31 March 2021 | 31 March 2024 | 28 February 2025 |
| 2020-21 | 28 February 2022 | 28 February 2025 | 28 February 2025, the exclusion does not apply |
Two consequences follow. First, a notice issued after the computed wall cannot stand under Section 73, whatever the correspondence that preceded it: the Court held that limitation governs the issuance of the order, and exchanges with the audit wing do not stop the clock. Second, once Section 73 is closed, the entire demand stands or falls on Section 74, which raises the bar for the department considerably.
Test two: did the officer record his own satisfaction?
Proceedings under Sections 73 and 74 can be initiated only on the satisfaction of the proper officer. An audit objection, even one from the Comptroller and Auditor General, is an input to that satisfaction, never a substitute for it. The officer must independently apply his mind before the notice issues.
For a Section 74 notice, the satisfaction operates at two levels. The officer must be satisfied that the mismatch or short payment occurred, and separately that fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression caused it. The second level is the key to the extended period, and it is the one a template notice almost never records.
The notice's own history is evidence here. In Tata Steel, the department transferred the notice to the call book within a fortnight of issuing it and contested the audit objection before the Public Accounts Committee, while also proposing a protective demand to save limitation. The Court treated that conduct as showing there was no satisfaction even about the underlying mismatch, let alone the suppression alleged, and recorded that protective demands are alien to the GST regime. If your notice was parked, revived near a deadline, or issued while the department disputed the objection elsewhere, that history belongs in the reply.



